Trust in data – II

I just picked up on this, now not so recent, news item about the prosecution of Steven Eaton. Eaton was gaoled for falsifying data in clinical trials. His prosecution was pursuant to the Good Laboratory Practice Regulations 1999. The Regulations apply to chemical safety assessments and come to us, in the UK, from that supra-national body the OECD. Sadly I have managed to find few details other than the press reports. I have had a look at the website of the prosecuting Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency but found nothing beyond the press release. I thought about a request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 but wonder whether an exemption is being claimed pursuant to section 31.

It’s a shame because it would have been an opportunity to compare and contrast with another notable recent case of industrial data fabrication, that concerning BNFL and the Kansai Electric contract. Fortunately, in that case, the HSE made public a detailed report.

In the BNFL case, technicians had fabricated measurements of the diameters of fuel pellets in nuclear fuel rods, it appears principally out of boredom at doing the actual job. The customer spotted it, BNFL didn’t. The matter caused huge reputational damage to BNFL and resulted in the shipment of nuclear fuel rods, necessarily under armed escort, being turned around mid-ocean and returned to the supplier.

For me, the important lesson of the BNFL affair is that businesses must avoid a culture where employees decide what parts of the job are important and interesting to them, what is called intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is related to a sense of cognitive ease. That sense rests, as Daniel Kahneman has pointed out, on an ecology of unknown and unknowable beliefs and prejudices. No doubt the technicians had encountered nothing but boringly uniform products. They took that as a signal, and felt a sense of cognitive ease in doing so, to stop measuring and conceal the fact that they had stopped.

However, nobody in the supply chain is entitled to ignore the customer’s wishes. Businesses need to foster the extrinsic motivation of the voice of the customer. That is what defines a job well done. Sometimes it will be irksome and involve a lot of measuring pellets whose dimensions look just the same as the last batch. We simply have to get over it!

The customer wanted the data collected, not simply as a sterile exercise in box-ticking, but as a basis for diligent surveillance of the manufacturing process and as a critical component of managing the risks attendant in real world nuclear industry operations. The customer showed that a proper scrutiny of the data, exactly what they had thought that BNFL would perform as part of the contract, would have exposed its inauthenticity. BNFL were embarrassed, not only by their lack of management control of their own technicians, but by the exposure of their own incapacity to scrutinise data and act on its signal message. Even if all the pellets were of perfect dimension, the customer would be legitimately appalled that so little critical attention was being paid to keeping them so.

Data that is properly scrutinised, as part of a system of objective process management and with the correct statistical tools, will readily be exposed if it is fabricated. That is part of incentivising technicians to do the job diligently. Dishonesty must not be tolerated. However, it is essential that everybody in an organisation understands the voice of the customer and understands the particular way in which they themselves add value. A scheme of goal deployment weaves the threads of the voice of the customer together with those of individual process management tactics. That is what provides an individual’s insight into how their work adds value for the customer. That is what provides the “nudge” towards honesty.

Trust in data – I

I was listening to the BBC’s election coverage on 2 May (2013) when Nick Robinson announced that UKIP supporters were five times more likely than other voters to believe that the MMR vaccine was dangerous.

I had a search on the web. The following graphic had appeared on Mike Smithson’s PoliticalBetting blog on 21 April 2013.

MMR plot

It’s not an attractive bar chart. The bars are different colours. There is a “mean” bar that tends to make the variation look less than it is and makes the UKIP bar (next to it) look more extreme. I was, however, intrigued so I had a look for the original data which had come from a YouGov survey of 1765 respondents. You can find the data here.

Here is a summary of the salient points of the data from the YouGov website in a table which I think is less distracting than the graphic.

Voting   intention Con. Lab. Lib. Dem. UKIP
No. Of   respondents 417 518 142 212
% % % %
MMR safe 99 85 84 72
MMR unsafe 1 3 12 28
Don’t know 0 12 3 0

My first question was: Where had Nick Robinson and Mike Smithson got their numbers from? It is possible that there was another survey I have not found. It is also possible that I am being thick. In any event, the YouGov data raises some interesting questions. This is an exploratory date analysis exercise. We are looking for interesting theories. I don’t think there is any doubt that there is a signal in this data. How do we interpret it? There does look to be some relationship between voting intention and attitude to public safety data.

Should anyone be tempted to sneer at people with political views other than their own, it is worth remembering that it is unlikely that anyone surveyed had scrutinised any of the published scientific research on the topic. All will have digested it, most probably at third hand, through the press, internet, or cooler moment. They may not have any clear idea of the provenance of the assurances as to the vaccination’s safety. They may not have clearly identified issues as to whether what they had absorbed was a purportedly independent scientific study or a governmental policy statement that sought to rely on the science. I suspect that most of my readers have given it no more thought.

The mental process behind the answers probably wouldn’t withstand much analysis. This would be part of Kahneman’s System 1 thinking. However, the question of how such heuristics become established is an interesting one. I suspect there is a factor here that can be labelled “trust in data”.

Trust in data is an issue we all encounter, in business and in life. How do we know when we can trust data?

A starting point for many in this debate is the often cited observation of Brian Joiner that, when presented with a numerical target, a manager has three options: Manage the system so as to achieve the target, distort the system so the target is achieved but at the cost of performance elsewhere (possibly not on the dashboard), or simply distort the data. This, no doubt true, observation is then cited in support of the general proposition that management by numerical target is at best ineffective and at worst counter productive. John Seddon is a particular advocate of the view that, whatever benefits may flow from management by target (and they are seldom championed with any great energy), they are outweighed by the inevitable corruption of the organisation’s data generation and reporting.

It is an unhappy view. One immediate objection is that the broader system cannot operate without targets. Unless the machine part’s diameter is between 49.99 and 50.01 mm it will not fit. Unless chlorine concentrations are below the safe limit, swimmers risk being poisoned. Unless demand for working capital is cut by 10% we will face the consequences of insolvency. Advocates of the target free world respond that those matters can be characterised as the legitimate voice of the customer/ business. It is only arbitrary targets that are corrosive.

I am not persuaded that the legitimate/ arbitrary distinction is a real one, nor how the distinction motivates two different kinds of behaviour. I will blog more about this later. Leadership’s urgent task is to ensure that all managers have the tools to measure present reality and work to improve it. Without knowing how much improvement is essential a manager cannot make rational decisions about the allocation of resources. In that context, when the correct management control is exercised, improving the system is easier than cheating. I shall blog about goal deployment and Hoshin Kanri on another occasion.

Trust in data is just a factor of trust in general. In his popular book on evolutionary psychology and economics, The Origins of Virtue, Matt Ridley observes the following.

Trust is as vital a form of social capital as money is a form of actual capital. … Trust, like money, can be lent (‘I trust you because I trust the person who told me he trusts you’), and can be risked, hoarded or squandered. It pays dividends in the currency of more trust.

Within an organisation, trust in data is something for everybody to work on building collaboratively under diligent leadership. As to the public sphere, trust in data is related to trust in politicians and that may be a bigger problem to solve. It is also a salutary warning as to what happens when there is a failure of trust in leadership.