Deconstructing Deming V – Improve constantly and forever

5. Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service, to improve quality and productivity, and thus constantly decrease costs.

W Edwards Deming Point 5 of Deming’s 14 Points. Surely about this there can be no controversy.

Improvement means reducing operating costs, enhancing customer value, and developing flexibility and agility. Improvement means constantly diminishing the misalignment between the Voice of the Process and the Voice of the Customer.

The UK awaits fresh productivity statistics next month but the figures up to the end of 2013 make sobering reading. UK productivity has been in miserable decline since 2008. In response to tightening of demand, failures of liquidity, absence of safe investment alternatives, rises in taxation and straightened cash flows, the aggregate response of industry has been a decline in human efficiency.

The reasons this has happened are no doubt complex. The paradox remains that it is improvement in productivity that grows sustainable rewards, captures markets and releases working capital for new ventures. At first sight it appears the answer to all the ills of a recession.

How will you know?

In their seminal model for improving productivity, Thomas Nolan and Lloyd Provost posed the question:

How will you know when a change is an improvement?

It is such a simple questions but it is too seldom asked and I suspect that itself is a major barrier to improvement.

We are beset by human induced change, by government and by business managers. The essential discipline is critically to question whether such change results in an improvement. It is an unpopular question. Nobody who champions a particular change wants to be proved wrong, or confronted with a marginal improvement that fails to live up to an extravagant promise.

Business measurement is mandated in the modern corporation. Businesses, governments, organisations abound with KPIs, metrics, “Big Ys”, results measures … and often a distracting argument over what to call them. There is no lack of numbers for answering the question. We are constantly assured that we now have the Big Data whose absence frustrated past strategy.

The habitual analytic tool in old-style businesses was what Don Wheeler mischievously named the executive time series, two numbers, one larger (or smaller) than the other, selected to show movement in the desired direction. That is, as Scottish folklorist Andrew Lang put it:

… using statistics in the same way that a drunk uses lamp-posts — for support rather than illumination.

It is a moral certainty that no two measurements will yield the same number. One will be larger than the other. It will be easy to select two to support any pet project or theory.

Building a persuasive case that improvement has happened firstly requires a rigorously constructed baseline. Without an objective description of the historical experience base, claims as to improvement are simply speculative.

And beyond that, what the executive time series cannot do is distinguish signal from noise. It cannot help because the answer to the question When will you know …? is When there is a signal in the data. That can only be answered with the diligent and rigorous use of process behaviour charts.

At the top of this page is a “RearView” tab. Without the trenchant and determined use of process behaviour charts there is not even a white line in the rear view mirror. The only signal will come from the “bang” when we hit the kerb.

What to improve

Deming’s further message was that it was every process that was to be improved, not simply those whose customer was the end consumer. Many processes have internal customers with their own voice. Processes of management of human resources, maintenance and accounting can all have a critical impact on organisation performance. They must keep on getting better too.

Being held to account is never comfortable but neither is the realisation that we have surrendered control of assets without the means of knowing when such assets are incrementally put to increasingly efficient, effective and agile use.

We need louder demands of “Show me!”

The dark side of discipline

W Edwards Deming was very impressed with Japanese railways. In Out of the Crisis (1986) he wrote this.

The economy of a single plan that will work is obvious. As an example, may I cite a proposed itinerary in Japan:

          1725 h Leave Taku City.
          1923 h Arrive Hakata.
Change trains.
          1924 h Leave Hakata [for Osaka, at 210 km/hr]

Only one minute to change trains? You don’t need a whole minute. You will have 30 seconds left over. No alternate plan was necessary.

My friend Bob King … while in Japan in November 1983 received these instructions to reach by train a company that he was to visit.

          0903 h Board the train. Pay no attention to trains at 0858, 0901.
          0957 h Off.

No further instruction was needed.

Deming seemed to assume that these outcomes were delivered by a capable and, moreover, stable system. That may well have been the case in 1983. However, by 2005 matters had drifted.

Aftermath of the Amagasaki rail crashThe other night I watched, recorded from the BBC, the documentary Brakeless: Why Trains Crash about the Amagasaki rail crash on 25 April 2005. I fear that it is no longer available in BBC iPlayer. However, most of the documentaries in this BBC Storyville strand are independently produced and usually have some limited theatrical release or are available elsewhere. I now see that the documentary is available here on Dailymotion.

The documentary painted a system of “discipline” on the railway where drivers were held directly responsible for outcomes, overridingly punctuality. This was not a documentary aimed at engineers but the first thing missing for me was any risk assessment of the way the railway was run. Perhaps it was there but it is difficult to see what thought process would lead to a failure to mitigate the risks of production pressures.

However, beyond that, for me the documentary raised some important issues of process discipline. We must be very careful when we make anyone working within a process responsible for its outputs. That sounds a strange thing to say but Paul Jennings at Rolls-Royce always used to remind me You can’t work on outcomes.

The difficulty that the Amagasaki train drivers had was that the railway was inherently subject to sources of variation over which the drivers had no control. In the face of those sources of variation, they were pressured to maintain the discipline of a punctual timetable. They way they did that was to transgress other dimensions of process discipline, in the Amagasaki case, speed limits.

Anybody at work must diligently follow the process given to them. But if that process does not deliver the intended outcome then that is the responsibility of the manager who owns the process, not the worker. When a worker, with the best of intentions, seeks independently to modify the process, they are in a poor position, constrained as they are by their own bounded rationality. They will inevitably by trapped by System 1 thinking.

Of course, it is great when workers can get involved with the manager’s efforts to align the voice of the process with the voice of the customer. However, the experimentation stops when they start operating the process live.

Fundamentally, it is a moral certainty that purblind pursuit of a target will lead to over-adjustment by the worker, what Deming called “tampering”. That in turn leads to increased costs, aggravated risk and vitiated consumer satisfaction.

Target and the Targeteers

This blog appeared on the Royal Statistical Society website Statslife on 29 May 2014

DartboardJohn Pullinger, newly appointed head of the UK Statistics Authority, has given a trenchant warning about the “unsophisticated” use of targets. As reported in The Times (London) (“Targets could be skewing the truth, statistics chief warns”, 26 May 2014 – paywall) he cautions:

Anywhere we have had targets, there is a danger that they become an end in themselves and people lose sight of what they’re trying to achieve. We have numbers everywhere but haven’t been well enough schooled on how to use them and that’s where problems occur.

He goes on.

The whole point of all these things is to change behaviour. The trick is to have a sophisticated understanding of what will happen when you put these things out.

Pullinger makes it clear that he is no opponent of targets, but that in the hands of the unskilled they can create perverse incentives, encouraging behaviour that distorts the system they sought to control and frustrating the very improvement they were implemented to achieve.

For example, two train companies are being assessed by the regulator for punctuality. A train is defined as “on-time” if it arrives within 5 minutes of schedule. The target is 95% punctuality.
TrainTargets
Evidently, simple management by target fails to reveal that Company 1 is doing better than Company 2 in offering a punctual service to its passengers. A simple statement of “95% punctuality (punctuality defined as arriving within 5 minutes of timetable)” discards much of the information in the data.

Further, when presented with a train that has slipped outside the 5 minute tolerance, a manager held solely to the target of 95% has no incentive to stop the late train from slipping even further behind. Certainly, if it puts further trains at risk of lateness, there will always be a temptation to strip it of all priority. Here, the target is not only a barrier to effective measurement and improvement, it is a threat to the proper operation of the railway. That is the point that Pullinger was seeking to make about the behaviour induced by the target.

And again, targets often provide only a “snapshot” rather than the “video” that discloses the information in the data that can be used for planning and managing an enterprise.

I am glad that Pullinger was not hesitant to remind users that proper deployment of system measurement requires an appreciation of psychology. Nobel Laureate psychologist Daniel Kahneman warns of the inherent human trait of thinking that What you see is all there is (WYSIATI). On their own, targets do little to guard against such bounded rationality.

In support of a corporate programme of improvement and integrated in a culture of rigorous data criticism, targets have manifest benefits. They communicate improvement priorities. They build confidence between interfacing processes. They provide constraints and parameters that prevent the system causing harm. Harm to others or harm to itself. What is important is that the targets do not become a shield to weak managers who wish to hide their lack of understanding of their own processes behind the defence that “all targets were met”.

However, all that requires some sophistication in approach. I think the following points provide a basis for auditing how an organisation is using targets.

Risk assessment

Targets should be risk assessed, anticipating realistic psychology and envisaging the range of behaviours the targets are likely to catalyse.

Customer focus

Anyone tasked with operating to a target should be periodically challenged with a review of the Voice of the Customer and how their own role contributes to the organisational system. The target is only an aid to the continual improvement of the alignment between the Voice of the Process and the Voice of the Customer. That is the only game in town.

Borrowed validation

Any organisation of any size will usually have independent data of sufficient borrowing strength to support mutual validation. There was a very good recent example of this in the UK where falling crime statistics, about which the public were rightly cynical and incredulous, were effectively validated by data collection from hospital emergency departments (Violent crime in England and Wales falls again, A&E data shows).

Over-adjustment

Mechanisms must be in place to deter over-adjustment, what W Edwards Deming called “tampering”, where naïve pursuit of a target adds variation and degrades performance.

Discipline

Employees must be left in no doubt that lack of care in maintaining the integrity of the organisational system and pursuing customer excellence will not be excused by mere adherence to a target, no matter how heroic.

Targets are for the guidance of the wise. To regard them as anything else is to ask them to do too much.

Deconstructing Deming IV – Supply chain

4. End the practice of awarding business on the basis of a price tag. Instead, minimize total cost. Move towards a single supplier for any one item, on a long-term relationship of loyalty and trust.

W Edwards Deming Point 4 of Deming’s 14 Points. For me, this is where Deming’s thinking starts to mark itself out from mainstream thinking. Moreover, the departure is tough to follow.

The key phrase is “long-term relationship of loyalty and trust”. Deming believed that benefit was maximised when organisations co-operated to create customer value and eliminate waste, internally and at the interface.

He bemoaned the “adversarial” nature of western purchasing, criticising it as wasteful and operating counter to continual improvement. Continual improvement is synonymous with improving the alignment between the voice of the process and the voice of the customer.

Deming further raised the more technical statistical issue that inter-supplier variability would always be greater than intra-supplier variability. In that itself, he argued, lay a dominant source of variation, and inevitably cost. Choosing a single supplier eliminated such variation at a stroke.

Trust

I have blogged a lot about trust here. The fact is that the business world turns on trust. This is not an obscure or even novel insight. I have blogged elsewhere about Matt Ridley’s analysis of trust in the evolution of co-operation. In his book The Origins of Virtue he quotes Nobel Laureate economist Kenneth Arrow.

Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust.

— and entrepreneur Nigel Vinson:

Trust everyone unless you have a reason not to.

But Deming wanted to go further and end the perpetual challenge as to price tag and the perilously provisional wedlock of business entities. Value was created through a chain, or even network, of activities. Organisational boundaries, and the consequential border skirmishes, were effectively internal disputes, irrelevant to the customer, other than in being antagonistic to his interests.

For Deming, the animus of continual improvement, motivated by the workforce’s “joy in work”, would replace the fear of being under priced, or the greed for tapping “blue ocean” profits, as the prime mover of enterprise. Businesses so driven would naturally co-operate rather than compete and liberate a cascade of escalating economic benefits inherent in common purpose.

Ease

However, I think that the difficulty of such relationships is that human beings soon become conservative and complacent. They will not face the big challenges. Without the fear and the greed, it would be unthinkable to marshal the sort of resources that are necessary to develop a new computer or a novel aero-engine. It would be unthinkable to gamble society’s accumulated wealth on developing a new drug, a technology predicated on the microscopic bases of life or an income stream dependent upon populating outer space.

The principle is akin to Daniel Kahneman’s concept of cognitive ease. Each of us is disinclined to think too hard. Only greed or fear will be the spur, to hard thinking or to risk taking. Businesses represent real risk for their investors. Risks that investors are only willing to take over a finite horizon.

Economics

In commercial law, we often talk about business people dealing at arm’s length. We use that term to emphasise that the relationship is one of calculation as to profit and loss, without an emotional or affective dimension. Ventures between enterprises are not marriages “in sickness and in health”. The extent to which any organisation can be prepared to accommodate the misfortune of another is strictly limited to the self interest of a short time scale. To go further is to mistake inter-organisational dynamics for inter-personal affection.

Organisations only form, express and develop their relationships through the individuals who work for them. Inevitable misalignments arise and create agency costs. People shift, though Deming wished they didn’t. It is very difficult to recognise the sort of co-habitation that Deming envisaged in law. And if not recognised in law, how can the trust operate long term over shifting agents? The English case of Baird Textile Holdings v M&S illustrates the difficulties of trying to found business expectations on past relationships.

What Deming seems to ignore is the wealth of economic scholarship that is relevant to supply chain decisions. He identifies limitations of the competitive environment and exhorts us to embrace the benefits of closer and longer lasting ties. However, nowhere does he treat the advantages of remorseless competition or the disadvantages of a too narrow supply base.

In Deming’s analysis there is no concept of an efficient breach, as the costs (to society) of the destruction of trust are deemed to be, at once, unknown and unknowable, but surely to outweigh the calculations of the profit and loss account.

Competition law

There seems little doubt that much of what Deming advocated as to co-operation between organisations, and in particular in sharing information, would run foul of modern competition law. Deming saw competition law as a barrier to his new philosophy. In Out of the Crisis he wrote (p26):

Obstacles to the competitive position of American industry created by government regulations and anti-trust activities must be revised to support the well-being of the American people, and not to depress it.

The history of economic development offers ample testimony as to what happens when business people combine against the public, free from supervision or sanction. Much as Deming believed his exhortations would benefit the public, those sort of economic-legal policies can only be assessed through data generation on a global scale, trenchant analysis and imaginative policy creation. Then more data generation …. A point that one would have hoped that Deming would appreciate.

Legacy

Nominating a single supplier, embraced in a long term relationship of tolerance, mutual understanding and (lawful) benefit sharing, without a lucid vision of how that relationship would be managed and a cogent analysis of the risks, mitigated with robust safeguards, would be folly indeed.

However, Deming does remind us of some fundamentals of doing business successfully.

Build trust.

Work together.

Continually seek to reduce variation.

Ninety years on

Walter ShewhartOn 16 May 1924, ninety years ago today, Walter Shewhart sent his manager a short memo, no longer than one page. Shewhart described what came to be called the control chart, what we would today call a process behaviour chart.

Shewhart, a physicist by training and engineer by avocation, had been involved in improving the reliability of radio and telegraph hardware for the Western Electric Company. Equipment buried underground was often costly to repair and maintain. Shewhart had realised that the key to reliability improvement was reduction in manufactured product variation. If variation could, hypothetically, be eliminated then everything would work or everything would fail. If everything failed it would soon be fixed. Variability confounded improvement efforts.

Shewhart shared a profound insight about variation with a diverse group of independent contemporaries including Bruno de Finetti and W E Johnson. If we wanted to be able to reduce variation, we had to be able to predict it. Working to reduce variation turned on the ability to predict future behaviour.

De Finetti and Johnson were philosophers who didn’t go as far as turning their ideas into instrumental tools. The control chart turned out to be the silver bullet for predicting the future. It is a convivial tool. Shewhart invented it ninety years ago today.

If it isn’t supporting and guiding your predictions, you’re ninety years out of date (assuming that you’re reading today).

See the RearView tab at the top of the page for further background.